

# Risk Modelling

# Topics

Part I :Risk definitions and modeling in economics

Part II : Modelisation of risk dependance structure.



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Journée Modélisation ECCOREv  
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G.B. 2007



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# Landslides



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# TSUNAMIS

## Adverse Selection ? Or Moral Hazard ?



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# BLAZES : Moral Hazard or Adverse Selection ?



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# La Provence

LUNDI 19 MAI 2008.

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2008:  
Mandanda

## Les maisons hors la loi dans les zones à risques

**Menaces** Inondations, feux de forêt, avalanches, séismes... les risques naturels sont nombreux dans notre région.

**Plans** L'État a ainsi identifié huit risques majeurs et chargé les préfectures d'élaborer des plans de prévention.

**Mesures** Outre le refus des permis de construire, expropriations et démolitions sont désormais appliquées. ► page 24

# Zones à risques : les maisons pourront être détruites

Thierry Noir et nos agences  
tnoir@laprovence-presse.fr

C'est une tendance lourde de notre société : la France du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle veut tendre vers le "risque zéro". Dans notre région, les risques de catastrophes naturelles sont grands : qu'on se souvienne des 37 morts de Vaison-la-Romaine, après les crues torrentielles de l'Ouvèze, en 1992, ou des 8 000 sinistrés du pays d'Arles, quand, en 2003, le Rhône est sorti de son lit !

Les Alpes-de-Haute-Provence connaissent aussi des risques d'avalanche et de feux de forêt, alors que les Bouches-du-Rhône vivent avec les risques industriels des usines classées Seveso.

Pour répondre à l'évolution de la société, l'État a identifié huit risques majeurs. Chaque préfecture doit élaborer des plans de prévention de ces risques. Et en tirer les conséquences. Il ne s'agit même plus uniquement d'interdire la construction future de maisons dans des zones dorénavant jugées dangereuses



► Entre les risques de feux de forêt, d'avalanches et d'inondations, la région Paca possède de nombreuses zones dangereuses. En 2003, une crue du Rhône avait ainsi sinistré le quartier du Trébon, à Arles, comme le montre cette vue aérienne.

/ PHOTO ARCHIVES JÉRÔME REY

(lire ci-dessous). L'État va me jusqu'à racheter, pour démolir, les habitations autres implantations humaines dans des endroits qués.

Ces plans, dont l'élaboration est longue, ne sont encore en vigueur. Mais déjà, un certain nombre de directions départementales l'équipement les appliquent "par anticipation", notamment dans le Var, et refusent des permis de construire attaquent devant les tribunaux ceux déjà signés.


Reste qu'il y a, par exemple, des gens qui ont traversé toute leur vie pour transmettre leur maison à leurs enfants. Or celle-ci n'a plus de valeur, car en cas d'incendie de forêt, elle ne pourrait être reconstruite. D'autant que certains ont acheté des terrains constructibles... sur lesquels ils ne peuvent pas bâtir.

Si les intentions de l'Etat sont louables, les indemnités liées à l'application de la loi pourraient utilement être revues. ■

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# Health Risks

## SCIENTIFIC VS STATISTICAL KNOWLEDGE



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## e.g. : Risk of Aneurysm Rupture

- Statistical knowledge  
(e.g. Logit-Probit Regressions after identifying the risk factors)
- Scientific knowledge applied to comprehensive clinical exams specific to the case.
- Experts' judgments (physicians or Artery specialists)

Q : Why do insurance companies do not propose medical insurance for senior people ? R: The risk is assessed by people according to their knowledge


- for younger people : statistical (common) knowledge dominates private knowledge
- for older people : personal records and private knowledge dominates statistical knowledge

This leads to adverse selection problems.


# Risk and Decisions

**Modelling Uncertainty and Decisions under Uncertainty**

# Uncertain Events



# Simplified Representation of Risk Decision



# RISK = MISSING INFORMATION


**There is risk because one can choose the bad action**

- When information is complete, there is no more risk
- When there is no possible dodging action, there is no risk.


Pb : information is unequally shared by those who can control the dodging actions.

(Often those who know best are not those who act)


# Multiple Consequences




# Decision Tree




# Decision Tree: Backward Induction



# Decision Tree: Backward Induction II



# Decision Tree: Backward Induction III



# How to Value Uncertain Prospects?


Problem 1: Likelihood : probability, capacities, scenarii (os),  
fuzzy sets, rankings...

Problem 2: independence "likelihood - valuation" ?

Problem 3: tractability (linear algebra, differential calculus,  
probability theory)

# The Old Bernoulli Model

$$U[pV_H + (1-p)V_L] > pU(V_H) + (1-p)U(V_L) \quad (\text{Jensen's inequality})$$



# Risk Aversion

Most empirical studies in finance, insurance and economics exhibit the existence of RISK PREMIA.

They are evidence of a widespread human attitude toward risk, termed "*risk aversion*" and measured by different direct (e.g. Arrow-Pratt measures) or indirect artifacts

# Bernouilli's Followers and Critics

## Founding fathers;


## **Source of Information for Assessing Likelihood**

- Statistical knowledge about the risk occurrence
- Scientific (specific) knowledge about the driving risk factor
- Experts' Judgments

Each risk assessment is a mix of the three sources.

- If scientific investigation is comprehensive enough, no need for statistical knowledge.
- When both statistical and scientific knowledge are weak, expert opinions dominate
- Expert judgments is expression of "tacit knowledge"

# Interactive Risks : Game Theory



# Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

**Moral Hazard:** risk for a given agent is induced by the action of another agents without possibility of monitoring.

Ex : car insurance : Risk for the insurer depends on traffic hazard risk and risk of misconduct of the driver who does not suffer consequences due to insurance coverage.

**Adverse Selection:** due to *asymmetry of information* an agent who seek to trade with low risk partners attracts high risk partners

Typical example : the Akerlof Model

# Expert Opinions

Opinion expressions:

- Comparative Likelihood : binary relationships
- Likelihood rankings : complete preorders
- Fuzzy sets
- Choquet capacities
- Probabilities
- scenarii (ios)

Pb : Mitigate cognitive biases.

# Risk Analysis and Epistemic Logic

- Modelling information distributed among many agents
- What is "common knowledge" (mathematical difficulties : e.g. The e-mail paradox)
- Public knowledge is different than common knowledge.
- Level of relative knowledge
- What is "disagreement" ?

# Aggregation of Expert Opinions

-Logical difficulties :

ex. aggregating probabilities

- Agreeing to disagree ? (R. Aumann)

- Cognitive and psychological difficulties


- Ex: group influences on risk aversion

- Bayesian approaches

- Aggregation via market system


# **Aggregation by Market Systems: Hurricane Futures**

**Can a financial market predict  
hurricane landfalls  
better than expert risk models ?**




# Liquidation (Final) Values of Contract $L_s$

1 contract for each location  $s \quad s = 1, S$  ( $S$  can be up to 17)



Bundle of  $S$  contracts Exhaustive and Exclusive  
(One will necessarily end up with 1 and all other  
with 0)

Initial bundle purchasing price 1\$ : fair game



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# Hurricane Future Market

## Market Quotes: DEAN

Date	Contract	Units	\$Volume	LowPrice	HighPrice	AvgPrice	LastPrice
08/14/07	DEA-W	203	113.295	0.2	0.995	0.558	0.995

# Modelisation of Financial Market Risks

- The finance academic Credo : markets are efficient  
(They rationally aggregate information)

This implies certain types of stochastic processes underlying prices, in particular processes without memory (Markovian).

Typical examples : random walk, Ito process.

Mathematical tractability requires (Levy) stable laws (typical example : Gauss)

## PART II : Risk Dependance

# How to Model Risk Dependence

Variables :  $(X_1, \dots, X_i, \dots, X_n) = \mathbf{X}$

## 1) Deterministic models with noise

$$f(\mathbf{X}, \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}) = 0$$

$\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$  is a vector of (in general independent) random variables

Typical example: regression models

$$X_1 = a + b_2 X_2 + \dots + b_n X_n + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon} \quad (\text{Variable } X_1 \text{ is privileged})$$

$$X_1 = b_1 X_1 + b_2 \log(X_3) + b_4 X_4^2 + b_5 X_5 \cdot X_1 + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon} \quad (\text{high flexibility for modelling})$$

## 2) Fully Stochastic models

$\mathbf{X}$  is a random vector  $f(\mathbf{X})$  density     $F(\mathbf{X})$  (cumulative)  
probability

Typical examples :

$\mathbf{X}$  is normal with mean 0 and matrix variance  $\Sigma^2$


$\mathbf{X}$  is student with mean 0 and parameters  $\Sigma^2$  and  $\nu$

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

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**Model  $Y = ax + b + \epsilon$**      $x$ : beta and  $\epsilon$ :normal



## Gaussian Dependence



## Elliptic dependence

# Dependance and Marginal Distributions

Choosing a distribution leads to set jointly a *dependence structure* and a class of *marginal distributions*.

ex:  $\mathbf{X} = (X_1, X_2)$  binormal implies:

- marginal  $X_1$  and marginal  $X_2$  normal
- elliptic dependence structure

# Copulas : Separating Dependance and Marginals

(For the sake of simplicity : 2-dimensional variables)

A copula is a continuous function  $C(u_1, u_2)$ , defined everywhere on the square  $[0, 1]^2$  such that:


$$C(0,0) = 0$$

$$C(u_1, 0) = C(u_2, 0) = 0$$

$$C(u_1, 1) = u_1 \text{ and } C(1, u_2) = u_2 \text{ for any } u_1 \text{ and } u_2 \text{ in } [0, 1]$$

For  $(v_1, v_2) >> (u_1, u_2)$ :

$$C(v_1, v_2) - C(v_1, u_2) - C(u_1, v_2) + C(u_1, u_2) \geq 0$$



## Sklar's Theorem

$F(x_1, x_2)$  bi-dimensional distribution

$F_1(x_1)$  : continuous marginal distribution in  $x_1$

$F_2(x_2)$  : continuous marginal distribution in  $x_2$

$F$  can be written as:



$$F(x_1, x_2) = C(F_1(x_1), F_2(x_2))$$


Where  $C$  is a (unique) copula


This theorem allows to "extract" the dependence structure from any distribution and use it with other marginals to reconstruct a new distribution.

Ex : Normal copula, Student copula,....




# Gaussian and Non-Gaussian Dependence








## Copule linéaire




# Frechet Bounds for Copulas



**C-**



$$\text{Max}(u_1+u_2-1, 0)$$






**C<sup>+</sup>**

$$\text{Min}(u_1, u_2)$$

$$C^-(u_1, u_2) \leq C(u_1, u_2) \leq C^+(u_1, u_2)$$




# Clayton Copula $1/\text{LOG}_a(a^{1/x}+a^{1/y}-1)$




$$\text{EXP}[-\gamma^* ((x-0.5)^2 + (y-0.5)^2 - (\alpha^*(x-y)^2 + \beta^*(x+y-1)))]$$

$$\alpha = -3 \quad \beta = 2 \quad \gamma = 0.01$$





**Orthogonal copula**  
**n odd**  
**tends to Frechet's as n grows**



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## Copula Estimation

General method : Maximum Likelihood

Copula limits :

Useful for spatial dependence

Difficulty to capture temporal dependence

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